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Dilution of the Black Vote: Revisiting the 
Oppressive Methods of Voting Rights 
Restoration for Ex-Felons 
 
Tara A. Jackson 
“[A] nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth 
and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid 
of its people.”  
       – John F. Kennedy1 
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In the midst of election season, as we are bombarded with constant 
updates on political propaganda, and cynical and analytical commentary 
on those vying for the title of 45th President of the United States of 
America, many are blissfully ignorant of the fact that a large number of 
African Americans have been muted in the democratic process. 
The right to vote, “[t]hough not regarded strictly as a natural right, 
but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under 
certain conditions, nevertheless . . . is regarded as a fundamental political 
right, because [it preserves] all rights.”2 This ability to cast a ballot and 
have a say in the political process is one that African Americans have 
fought, bled and died for.3 However, many ex-felons have essentially lost 
the right to vote because felon disenfranchisement laws have stripped 
them of this right. 
Since the early 1970s, the nation’s prison population has quadrupled 
to 2.2 million, making it the world’s biggest.4 That is five to ten times the 
incarceration rate in other democracies.5 This in itself, though alarming, 
is not a hard pill for many to swallow. However, coupled with the fact 
there are many institutional structures in American Society that ensure a 
steady flow of African Americans into the prison system, there is cause 
for concern. 
African Americans make up a large percent of the prison population, 
and not only are they faced with racial disparities in the federal 
sentencing guidelines,6 but upon release they stand on shaky ground 
when it comes to exercising their political power by voting.  Sentencing, 
though not racially neutral, is an adequate means of punishing felons for 
the crimes they have committed. This paper aims to highlight the impact 
of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws on the political power of African 
Americans, debunk the myths justifying such laws, and propose a 
                                                                                                             
2 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
3 See Keesha M. Middlemass, The Need To Resurrect Section 5 Of The Voting Rights 
Act Of 1965, 28 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 61, 102 (2015). “Black voters had to fight to 
the death for their voting rights under an umbrella that they were illegitimate voters based 
on their skin color.” Id. 
4  See THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds, 2014). 
5 Id. at 2. 
6 See Tushar Kansal, Racial Disparity in Sentencing: A Review of the Literature 
(2005), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/disparity.pdf. 
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solution that will not “over punish” ex-felons or subject them to arbitrary 
classification as second class citizens. 
Part II of this paper will briefly discuss the history of black voting 
rights and methods of black voter suppression as well as the nexus 
between the school to prison pipeline, the number of blacks that are 
currently incarcerated, and the difficulty faced by ex-felons to reinstate 
their voting rights.  Part III will discuss felon disenfranchisement in 
Florida, Iowa and Kentucky as well as the severely restrictive measures 
adopted by each state for voter reinstatement and how this 
disproportionately impacts African American political power. 
There is a great deal of scholarship supporting the reinstatement of 
ex-felon voting rights as a means of rehabilitation and as such, Part IV 
will propose a national uniform system that automatically reinstates 
voting rights for ex-felons after completion of their sentences, discuss a 
sliding scale approach that makes federal intervention constitutional and 
Eight and Fourteenth Amendment justifications for federal government 
intervention. Part IV will also present arguments for reconsidering the 
current precedence that would present roadblocks for invalidating felon 
disenfranchisement laws. Part V will conclude by showing how ex-felon 
disenfranchisement laws represent a badge of slavery, reiterate the 
importance of voting rights as a function of citizenry, and the need to 
eliminate hurdles that prohibit the exercising of political will of the black 
community. 
II. WE CAME, WE MARCHED, BUT HAVE WE CONQUERED? 
A. Return for Repackaging: Tools for Voter Suppression. 
To fully understand the implications of ex-felon disenfranchisement 
on black voting power, we must take a few steps back in time. From its 
inception, the franchise of voting in America was limited to white male 
property owners.7 It was in 1869 that the African American man got his 
right to vote through the passage of the Fifteen Amendment, which 
guaranteed the right to vote to all male citizens regardless of “race, color 
or previous condition of servitude.”8 Less than thirty years later, creative 
devices such as grandfather clauses, literacy tests and poll taxes began to 
surface. These ‘laws’ were specifically designed and used to suppress the 
black vote. 
                                                                                                             
7 DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (5th ed. 
2012). 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
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The Supreme Court made attempts to guard the black vote on 
occasion.  In Guinn v. United States for instance, grandfather clauses in 
the constitutions of Maryland and Oklahoma were deemed 
unconstitutional because they were repugnant to the Fifteenth 
Amendment.9 However, each time the Supreme Court invalidated those 
discriminatory laws, states continued to develop new, seemingly race-
neutral methods of black voter suppression to ensure that black political 
power remained diluted. The Supreme Court’s zealousness faded in 1937 
when the Court deemed Georgia’s poll taxes constitutional in Breedlove 
v. Suttles10, which remained good law until Harper v. Virginia State Bd. 
Of Elections11 in 1966, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the 
Voting Rights Act. 
B. Selma: Voting Rights for All. 
The infamous march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama in 1965 
is seen as one of the most critical campaigns in the quest for meaningful 
voting rights for blacks. Participants in the peaceful march for voting 
rights were met with tear gas, whips and nightsticks when they refused to 
turn back.  These efforts of black activism, and the outrage at how 
protesters were being treated, led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, which prohibited any election practice that denied the right to 
vote to citizens on the basis of race. 12 It essentially forced jurisdictions 
with histories of voter discrimination to submit any changes to its 
election laws to the government for federal approval prior to taking 
effect.13 Unfortunately, this was not the end of black voter suppression. 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act were constantly extended and 
amended to deal with new injustices as they arose. Notably, in Mobile v. 
Bolden,14 the Supreme Court read the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, and the Voting Rights Act very narrowly, requiring 
discriminatory intent to be established before a voting practice could be 
deemed a violation.  In response to this narrow reading, in 1982, the 
amendments to the Voting Rights Act overturned this ruling, noting that 
it was not necessary to establish discriminatory intent. 
History shows that the black vote has continuously been suppressed 
through creative mechanisms designed to circumvent anti-discrimination 
laws, and accordingly, any mechanism that disproportionately affects 
                                                                                                             
9 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
10 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
11 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
12  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
13 Id. 
14 Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
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black voting power must be met with the utmost suspicion.  With each 
amendment to the Voting Rights Act ending prior injustices, it is not 
expected that more modern forms of black voter suppression will 
manifest themselves as blatantly as they would have prior to the march in 
Selma. However, the systematic forces that result in mass black voter 
suppression remain alive and well. 
C. Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Same Product, Different 
Packaging. 
In 1974, the Supreme Court presented states with a new opportunity 
to suppress the black vote when the Court in Richardson v. Ramirez held 
that it was constitutional for states to deny convicted felons the right to 
vote.15 At first glance this ruling may seem racially neutral, but there are 
many institutional structures in place that ensure a steady inflow of 
blacks to prison, and therefore, ex-felon disenfranchisement laws must 
be examined closely. 
The School to Prison Pipeline16 is one such structure, which is 
known to disproportionately impact students of color.  By prioritizing 
incarceration over education, many schools serving predominantly black 
communities have zero-tolerance policies that do not allow students the 
‘luxury’ of a trip to the principal’s office as a response to undesirable 
behavior. For black students, violating school rules can easily land them 
in prison. The “historical inequalities in the education system—
segregated education, concentrated poverty, and longstanding 
stereotypes—influence how school officials and law enforcement both 
label children and treat students who present challenging behavior.”17 A 
2014 report from Department of Education Office for Civil Rights 
showed that school administrators expelled, and law enforcement 
arrested, African American students in startlingly disproportionate 
numbers compared to white students.18 These students who are 
unnecessarily forced out of school become stigmatized and as a result, 
                                                                                                             
15 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
16 “The ‘school-to-prison pipeline’ refers to the policies and practices that push our 
nation’s schoolchildren, especially our most at-risk children, out of classrooms and into 
the juvenile and criminal justice systems.” What Is The School-To-Prison Pipeline?, AM. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/what-school-prison-pipeline 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
17  School to Prison Pipeline, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, 
http://www.naacpldf.org/case/school-prison-pipeline (last visited Dec. 12, 2015). 
18 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: 
DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1 (2014), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf (noting that 
Black students are suspended and expelled at a rate three times greater than white 
students). 
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frequently fall behind in their academics, drop out of school and/or resort 
to committing crimes in their communities. 19 
On that note, it is no surprise that black men are incarcerated at a 
much higher rate than any other race in America.  Although mass 
incarceration can be attributed to public policy, it is institutionalized 
racism that ensured the sustenance of these policies over time. As of 
2012, one in seven African Americans were disenfranchised by felony 
convictions and in five states more than twenty percent of blacks could 
not vote because of their criminal records.20 In a stark comparison with 
times long gone, it was noted that in 2012, more African American men 
were “in the grip of the criminal-justice system - in prison, on probation, 
or on parole - than were in slavery.”21 More recently, in 2014, it was 
again noted that black males had higher imprisonment rates than 
prisoners of other races or Hispanic origin within every age group. 
Imprisonment rates for black males were 3.8 to 10.5 times greater at each 
age group than white males and 1.4 to 3.1 times greater than rates for 
Hispanic males.”22 With these details in mind, the race neutral façade of 
the ex-felon disenfranchisement laws is exposed. The issue of mass 
incarceration began to raise cause for concern in the 1970s, around the 
same time period of Richardson v. Ramirez, but is far worse now than 
ever.23 The fact that there is overrepresentation of blacks in the prison 
population is no accident, and “felon disenfranchisement laws, which 
trace back to the post-Reconstruction era when former Confederates and 
white Southern Democrats rolled back the political gains made by free 
slaves after the war“24, have been conveniently manipulated to constantly 
dilute the black vote. 
If one needs further evidence of the disproportionate impact that ex-
felon disenfranchisement laws have on the black vote, a quick 
                                                                                                             
19 Carla Amurao, Fact Sheet: How Bad Is the School-to-Prison Pipeline?, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/tavissmiley/tsr/education-under-arrest/school-to-prison-
pipeline-fact-sheet/ (last updated Mar. 28, 2013). 
20 George Lipsitz, In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty: The Collateral 
Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing Rights, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 1746, 1783 (2012). 
21 Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, 
NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-
caging-of-america?currentPage=all. 
22 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014 15 (2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf. 
23 See Editorial, End Mass Incarceration Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/opinion/sunday/end-mass-incarceration-
now.html?_r=0. 
24 See Jamelle Bouie, The Ex-Con Factor, THE AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://prospect.org/article/ex-con-factor. 
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comparison to prior suppression mechanisms is useful. Literacy tests, 
like the current felon disenfranchisement laws, were initially regarded 
race neutral.  However, the method of application and disproportionate 
impact on black voting power lead to the abolition of literacy tests. In 
one article, it was noted that felon disenfranchisement laws mirror the 
discriminatory nature of literacy tests in two significant ways: (1) they 
each depend on racial discrimination in other relevant areas of American 
society to produce a racially disparate impact, and (2) the racial bias 
associated with the discretionary implementation of each regulation 
serves to exclude minorities, particularly African Americans, from the 
political process.25  In recognition of the fact that some whites would 
inevitably fail the literacy tests, grandfather clauses were created, 
essentially permitting anyone who could vote on January 1, 1867, and his 
sons and grandsons, to continue to vote without passing the required 
literacy test. One may confidently infer that the invention of the 
grandfather clause shows that literacy tests were meant to be a catchall 
for blacks because it essentially allowed those whites that could 
potentially be deemed ‘illiterate’ to still participate in the democratic 
process because of their lineage. Clearly, blacks were unable to take 
advantage of the grandfather clauses because they were unable to vote 
until 1869, two years after the grandfather clause cut off. 
Also, the felon disenfranchisement laws also bare stark similarity to 
the poll taxes, which were utilized to filter out black voters from the 
political process.  Although also viewed as a race neutral measure, 
operationally it excluded a large number of black voters because many 
were unable to pay the tax levied due to financial constraints. Essentially, 
most blacks were excluded from the democratic process based on their 
economic circumstances. Felon disenfranchisement is similar in that it 
also excludes a large number of blacks from the democratic process 
because of their incarceration, the result of the institutional racist 
mechanisms such as over prosecution and disproportionately harsher 
sentencing for crimes compared to their white counterparts. However, 
the passage of the Twenty-fourth Amendment prevented states from 
continuing to use poll taxes to exclude blacks from the ballot.26 
One common misconception is that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
coupled with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments completely 
dismantled all the voting restrictions of the Jim Crow era, but felony 
disenfranchisement is arguably the last remaining strand of the web of 
laws carefully crafted to keep blacks from the ballot that remains 
                                                                                                             
25 Daniel S. Goldman, Note, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon 
Disenfranchisement and Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. REV. 611, 614 (2004). 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (addressing right to vote without poll tax). 
88 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:81 
 
unscathed by the Voting Rights Act.27 Recently, in Shelby County v. 
Holder, the Supreme Court essentially struck down key provisions in the 
Voting Rights Act and urged Congress to pass legislation that reflects the 
current conditions in America.28 One article perfectly encapsulated the 
gravity of this holding, noting 
“The voting rights that were fought for in the events of “Selma” are 
today under attack from state governments across the country . . . 
whether through simple gerrymandering, the intimidations of stringent 
voter-I.D. requirements . . . or the simple calculated scarcity of polling 
places . . . and even from the grossly disproportionate rate of 
incarceration, where felony convictions often result in 
disenfranchisement.” 29 
This holding gives us a glimpse of the Supreme Court’s indifference 
towards the impact that certain voting rights laws have on the black 
community.  A look back at the history books will reveal the true 
motives of passing felony disenfranchisement laws. In Florida, while 
granting suffrage to black citizens in 1868 with its rewritten constitution, 
the state simultaneously disenfranchised many of its new citizens by 
restricting all felons from voting for life.30 In Mississippi, 
disenfranchisement laws were modified to apply only to those convicted 
of certain petty crimes considered to be far more prevalent among black 
offenders than white.31 Today’s version of felony disenfranchisement, 
although not as narrowly tailored, “still disproportionately affects black 
citizens, diluting the power of the collective black vote in elections, and 
thus [still] explicitly fulfill[s] the legacy of the Jim Crow era.”32 
Over-policing of black neighborhoods, mass incarceration of blacks 
and the school to prison pipeline that remains entrenched in black 
communities represent some of the current ‘conditions’ that need to be 
remedied, but the majority in Shelby County v. Holder casually dismissed 
the effects of these realities when deeming the Voting Rights Act as 
‘outdated.’ However, with the state of the Supreme Court in flux due to 
                                                                                                             
27 See Elizabeth Simson, Justice Denied: How Felony Disenfranchisement Laws 
Undermine American Democracy, AM. FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION FUND 16 (2002), 
http://www.adaction.org/media/lizfullpaper.pdf. 
28 See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (noting “Our country has 
changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure 
that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”). 
29 Richard Brody, The Crucial Lessons of Democracy in “Selma”, THE NEW YORKER 
(Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-brody/crucial-lessons-
democracy-selma. 
30 See Simson, supra note 27. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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the sudden passing of the esteemed Justice Scalia,33 the attitude of the 
Court may very well shift with the appointment of a less conservative 
successor. The decision in Shelby County v. Holder, was 5-4 and the 
dissenting justices had no reservations when stating their vehement 
opposition, noting that while the majority acknowledged that voting 
discrimination still existed, it “terminates the remedy that proved to be 
best suited to block that discrimination.”34 Also, in response to the 
majority’s call for more modern legislation, the dissent highlighted that 
Congress, recognizing the progress that the Voting Rights Act has 
facilitated but noting that discrimination still pervaded the democratic 
process, decided that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act should continue 
in force.35 It appears that the dissent had a view that was more focused on 
the current state of American society than the majority, so it is not 
farfetched to assume that the new makeup of the Court is likely to 
become more receptive to the arguments being proposed in this note. 
III. THE ROCKY ROAD TO REINSTATEMENT 
Mercedies Harris was a young ex-Marine who was arrested in 1990 
for drug possession in Virginia at the age of twenty-seven.36 In prison, he 
earned his GED and upon release in 2003, he found a job and started to 
rebuild his life.37 He recounted that one especially difficult obstacle for 
him was that he could no longer vote.38 He noted, “It was important to 
[him] to have a place in this democracy, and to have a say, too.”39 With 
that he began the voting rights restoration process, which for him, lasted 
for four years.40 Thankfully, he was persistent enough to see it through. 
In 2014, then Attorney General Eric Holder pleaded with states to 
remove the restrictions on voting rights for ex-felons.41 The approach to 
ex-felon disenfranchisement varies tremendously from state to state. In 
some states, most ex-felons gain an automatic right to vote after 
completing their sentence. In others states, ex-felons have a waiting 
                                                                                                             
33 See, e.g., Brett Kendall, Scalia’s Absence Shifts Dynamic of Supreme Court, WALL. 
ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2016, 12:27 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/scalias-absence-shifts-
dynamics-of-supreme-court-1455419151. 
34 See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2633 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 2632-33. 





41 See Eric Holder, Remarks on Criminal Justice Reform, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 
11, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-
remarkson-criminal-justice-reform-georgetown. 
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period before their voting rights can be restored. The most extreme states 
require ex-felons to go through an application process to have their rights 
restored.  Even in the most lenient states, where voting rights are 
automatically restored, inconsistent communication, lack of information, 
massive backlogs and complicated paperwork can make the restoration 
process an overwhelming one. 
A. Florida 
On numerous occasions, Florida has been called the harshest state in 
relation to ex-felon disenfranchisement laws.  It is important to highlight 
that statistics reported in 2010 noted that African Americans comprise 
half of the state’s prison population, but represent only fifteen percent of 
the state’s overall population.42 Under the Florida Constitution, a 
convicted felon cannot vote, serve on a jury, or hold public office until 
civil rights have been restored.43 Additionally, the state requires ex-
felons to wait five years after completing their sentences before applying 
for restoration of rights without a hearing, and seven years for 
applications requiring a hearing. Assuming an ex-felon waits the 
requisite time, navigates through the complicated application process, 
and finally makes it to a hearing, he bears the burden of proving that he 
has become a “good citizen“.  If he does the right things, says the right 
things and becomes a pillar in his community, he still runs the risk of 
having his restoration application arbitrarily denied, without any reason. 
To understand how real the impact of these laws are on the 
democratic process and more specifically, black voting power, we can 
look back at the November 2000 presidential election. Florida’s felony 
disenfranchisement laws at that time excluded 600,000 ex-felons from 
participating in the electoral process. Many of these “ex-felons” were in 
fact mistakenly identified as such and banned from voting.44 This was 
due to a profoundly flawed purge process plagued by false positives.45 A 
study that estimated voter turnout and party preferences for felons and 
ex-felons showed that, from 1972 to 2000, around thirty-five percent of 
                                                                                                             
42 Inmate Population, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR, 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/0910/stats/im_pop.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
43 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4. 
44 See Marc Mauer, Disenfranchising Felons Hurts Entire Communities, JOINT CTR. 
FOR POLITICAL AND ECON. STUDIES 6 (May/June 2004), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_focus.pdf. 
45 See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the 
Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1158-59 (2004) (“For 
example, persons were removed because their names resembled those of convicted 
felons, or despite the fact that their convictions did not trigger disenfranchisement under 
Florida law, or even though their voting rights had been restored.”). 
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disenfranchised felons would have voted, and on average seventy-seven 
percent of felon voters would have voted Democratic.46 Professor 
Uggen’s data also asserted that, “approximately 10.5% of voting age 
African Americans . . . in Florida are disenfranchised as ex-felons, as 
compared to 4.4% of the non-African American population.”47  These 
statistics clearly demonstrate that disenfranchisement laws are most 
lethal to the African America community.  
B. Iowa 
According to the Iowa Constitution, “no idiot, or insane person, or 
person convicted of any infamous crime, shall be entitled to the privilege 
of an elector.48 The State defines an infamous crime as “a crime that may 
be punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary for a period of one year 
or more” and is not limited to felonies but “may include aggravated 
misdemeanors.”49 In order for an individual to have his voting rights 
restored, he must submit a streamlined application, a signed release, 
documentation verifying payments of court costs, fines and restitution 
and his Iowa criminal history record.50 Although Governor Terry 
Branstad simplified the application’s instructions, removed the credit 
check, and eliminated the requirement to fully pay off all restitution, 
fines, and court costs before applying for voting rights restoration, the 
process remains laborious. 
The ACLU challenged Iowa’s felon-voting laws, noting, “[t]he 
widespread denial of voting rights on the basis of a felony conviction is 
the single biggest denial of civil rights in Iowa. It has kept thousands of 
Iowans from voting.”51 Additionally, before these restrictive laws were 
adopted, an earlier policy allowed Iowa offenders automatically regain 
their voting rights when they left state supervision.52  Unsurprisingly, this 
                                                                                                             
46 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction?: Political 
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 
792-93 (2002). 
47 Karlan, supra note 45, at 1157. 
48 IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5. 
49 CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS FAQS, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF IOWA (Feb. 22, 2013), 
https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Citizenship-Rights-FAQ.pdf. 
50 Id. 
51 Ryan J. Foley, ACLS files lawsuit challenging Iowa felon-voting laws, THE DES 
MOINES REGISTER (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-
and-courts/2014/11/07/aclu-lawsuit-iowa-exfelon-voting-law/18654785/. 
52 When Governor Terry Branstad took office in Iowa in January 2011, he rescinded 
Executive Order 42 that had restored voting rights to Iowa citizens who had completed 
their sentences. See Rod Boshart, Branstad Rescinds Labor, Voting Orders, SIOUX CITY J. 
(Jan. 15, 2011), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/branstad-
rescinds-labor-voting-orders/article_af6e450c-b77f-5026-935b-b055d42cc167.html. 
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drastic policy change created confusion, which ultimately led to many 
perjury charges for ex-felon who casted ballots believing they were able 
to vote.53 Iowa, like Florida, is considered one of the harsher states with 
regards to felon disenfranchisement, and ex-felons in both states have 
had considerable confusion when attempting to navigate the road to 
reinstatement. It is safe to say that the various state structures in place for 
reinstatement of voting rights for ex-felons are so convoluted that many 
simply opt out of the reinstatement process altogether.  Those who 
decide to walk the rocky road to reinstatement do so with the hope that 
they will be given fair treatment, but of course, if such is not the case, 
their only recourse is to try and try again, as most states do not have 
safeguards to prevent arbitrary denial of petitions to restore voting rights. 
C. Kentucky 
Kentucky is another state that permanently disenfranchises ex-felons 
from voting. It is estimated that 243,842 Kentuckians with felony 
convictions were barred from voting in 2010 and of those, 180,984 had 
already completed their sentences.54 Under the state constitution, former 
felons have to petition the governor in order to have their voting rights 
restored. The process for doing so is a very tricky and lengthy one, and 
doesn’t guarantee a result, partly because each governor sets up his own 
procedure during his or her tenure. In 2014, as a substitute for automatic 
restoration, a Kentucky constitutional amendment that would restore 
most felons’ voting rights after a five-year waiting period passed in the 
senate.55  
However, the status of felon disenfranchisement in the state appears 
to have been in flux since then. Interestingly, the state’s current and 
previous governors appear to disagree on the issue of whether felon 
disenfranchisement is beneficial for the state.  
Steve Beshear, who was the Governor of Kentucky until late 2015, 
set up a process for restoration of voting rights for ex-felons shortly 
                                                                                                             
53 See Foley, supra note 51 (One such person, stay-at-home mother Kelli Jo Griffin, 
was the plaintiff in the 2014 ACLU lawsuit challenging Iowa’s felon voting laws). 
54 Background information on restoration of voting rights in Kentucky, KENTUCKIANS 
FOR THE COMMONWEALTH (2013), 
https://www.kftc.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/background_information_on_votin
g_rights_in_ky.pdf. 
55 Sam Youngman, Bill restoring felons’ voting rights passes Senate with five-year 
waiting period, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.kentucky.com/2014/02/19/3097375/senate-panel-okays-amendment-
to.html#storylink=cpy. 
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before he departed office.56 This step in the right direction was quickly 
undone by his successor, Matt Bevin, who believed that the issue of 
restoration of voting rights would be better addressed through the 
legislature.57 It is obvious that political friction has resulted in these 
inconsistencies and sadly, ex-felons attempting to navigate the path to 
reinstatement are left at the whim of each new governor. Like all other 
states that disenfranchise felons, Kentucky’s policy disproportionately 
impacts blacks. It is estimated that one in five African Americans in 
Kentucky are disenfranchised, compared to one in thirteen nationally.58  
Essentially black voting power is more diluted in Kentucky than it is 
nationwide. Also, noteworthy is the fact that Kentucky has the second 
highest African American disenfranchisement rate in the country.59   
Currently, in order for an ex-felon to have his or her voting rights 
restored in Kentucky, the individual must fill out a form60 requesting 
voting rights restoration through the Governor’s executive pardoning 
power. While this form itself is not as cumbersome to complete, the 
inconsistencies regarding the process for voting rights restoration is 
cause for concern. 
IV. THE CASE FOR AUTOMATIC RESTORATION OF VOTING 
RIGHTS 
“Without a vote, I am a ghost inhabiting a citizen’s 
space . . . “  
                                                                                                             
56 Kentucky Governor Creates New Process to Help Restore Voting Rights to 170,000 
Citizens, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/press-
release/kentucky-governor-creates-new-process-help-restore-voting-rights-170000-
citizens [hereinafter 170,000 Citizens]. 
57 Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Kentucky, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST..(Dec. 24, 
2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-
kentucky. 
58 170,000 Citizens, supra note 56. 
59 Felony Disenfranchisement in Kentucky, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF KY., 
http://innovise.me:8080/aclu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/hb_70_handout-for-new-
website.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2016). 
60 See Civil Rights Application, KY. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS (2015), 
http://corrections.ky.gov/communityinfo/Documents/Civil%20Rights/Civil%20Rights%2
0Application%20Rev%2011-25-2015.pdf (It is apparent that keeping ex-felon rights 
restoration information is not high on the State’s list of priorities because at the time of 
writing this article, the form that is widely available for ex-felons to complete for 
restoring voting rights was still not updated with information reflecting the reversal of the 
Governor B’s executive order.) 
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  – Joe Loya, disenfranchised ex-felon.61 
A.  IS FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT WARRANTED? 
Based on the statistics presented thus far, it is evident that a very 
large percent of the black population is funneled through the criminal 
justice system, and, as a result, temporarily or permanently lose their 
political power. Some of the earliest felon disenfranchisement laws rest 
on the Lockean theory that those who break the social contract should 
not be allowed to participate in the society’s rule making process.62 This 
social contract theory rests on the premise that all persons who break the 
‘social contract’ are convicted, and, simply put, that is false. What 
remains true, however, is the fact that without any voice in the political 
process, these ex-felons will essentially be demoted to ‘second class 
citizens’ and are more likely to reoffend.63  Further, if we are to stay true 
to the social contract theory, in the purest sense, we must content with 
the notion that obligations are conditioned on benefits. To follow the 
social contract theory would mean that those who “break the contract” 
would, in addition to losing access to certain benefits, be free of some 
obligations to society. Such an inference would clearly lead to havoc so 
social contract theory as a justification for felon disenfranchisement is 
inherently flawed. 
There is no convincing explanation as to how allowing felons to vote 
disrupts imprisonment, nor is there any solid argument for how stripping 
an ex-felon of his right to vote furthers the goal of criminal 
rehabilitation. To the contrary, disenfranchisement shows how far away 
the American justice system has drifted from its focus on rehabilitation.  
Proponents of these disenfranchisement laws sometimes argue that 
making ex-felons go through a process to restore these rights will 
decrease recidivism. Yet, the shortfalls of the restoration process often 
lead ex-felons to abandon the process altogether. “Research indicates that 
re-enfranchising ex-felons cuts the rate of recidivism by at least ten 
percent, which could save and reroute millions of dollars a year toward 
education or other useful purposes.”64   
Roger Clegg, a proponent of felon disenfranchisement, argues that 
two characteristics – trustworthiness and loyalty – are required in order 
                                                                                                             
61 Christine Thompson, Losing the Vote, PRISON ISSUES (1999). 
62 See Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Wesley v. 
Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). 
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to vote.65 However, not much creativity is needed to refute this claim. 
One federal statute unmistakably runs counter to Clegg’s theory in that it 
prohibits denying citizens the right to vote because they fail to 
demonstrate that they “possess good moral character.”66 This federal 
statute clearly recognizes Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “the crooked timber of 
humanity” which suggests that no individual is either wholly moral or 
immoral,67 and as such proving morality should never be required for one 
to participate in the democratic process. 
One other argument for the constitutionality of these 
disenfranchisement laws is the “purity of the ballot box” rationale, that 
is, a state’s interest “in preserving the integrity of [its] electoral process 
by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social 
behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society’s 
aims.”68 However, this argument fails to consider the disproportionate 
treatment that blacks get as opposed to their white counterparts for the 
same “anti-social behavior.” Martin Luther King correctly recognized the 
effects of denying blacks the right to vote noting, “the denial of the vote 
not only deprives the Negro of his constitutional rights - but what is even 
worse - it degrades him as a human being.”69 The purity of the ballot box 
argument perpetuates the blaming and shaming of blacks, which has 
historically proved to be an effective means for white supremacists to 
preserve their racial privileges without referring directly to race, and to 
disguise discrimination as family protection and moral uplift.70 
It is my submission that continued disenfranchisement serves no 
purpose other than to over-punish ex-felons. These people have already 
been through the judicial process, which punished them in a manner 
deemed appropriate based on the crime that was committed.  They have 
paid their debt to society and as such, rehabilitation and assimilation 
back into the community upon release are the goals that should be 
furthered instead of permanently inking them with the “stain of prior 
imprisonment.” Additionally, since disenfranchisement is not conferred 
by a judge as part of the sentencing process, it unfairly penalizes all 
convicted felons without regard to the severity of their offenses or any 
mitigating facts brought out in their trials. Simply put, felon 
                                                                                                             
65 Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV OF L. & POL’Y. 159, 174 (2001). 
66 52 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (3) (2012). 
67 See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY 
OF IDEAS (Henry Hardy ed., 2nd ed. 2013). 
68 Alice T. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence On The 
Black Vote: The Need For A Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1162-63 (1994). 
69 DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. ET AL., THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR: 
THRESHOLD OF A NEW DECADE, JANUARY 1959-DECEMBER 1960 188 (2005). 
70 Lipsitz, supra note 20. 
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disenfranchisement laws have no place in modern American society and 
as Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, disenfranchisement “doubtless has 
been brought forward into modern statutes without fully realizing the 
effect of its literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the 
spirit of our system of government.”71 
B. Legal Challenges: Tried and Failed. 
While there have been numerous legal challenges to felony 
disenfranchisement laws in the United States, most have been 
unsuccessful because courts have declined to apply the same legal 
principles regarding the fundamental right to vote to ex-felons. In an 
attempt to get any form of justice, some claims have even been brought 
regarding the misapplication of these disenfranchisement laws, 
vagueness in defining which crimes are disenfranchising, and the racial 
inequities inherent in the criminal justice system that result in minorities 
being disproportionately disenfranchised. It is evident, however, that any 
attempt to reshape felon disenfranchisement statutes at a federal level 
must surpass significant hurdles before they are even given serious 
consideration. 
Currently, in order to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, 
“plaintiffs must make two showings.72 They must first show that the 
voting law has a disproportionate impact and then demonstrate that 
discriminatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in its 
enactment.”73 However, the requirement to prove discriminatory intent 
unfairly places the burden on the victims to obtain information that 
oppressors will not likely provide them with. To prevent victims from 
successfully challenging these laws, lawmakers only need a facially 
neutral reason, such as the purity of the ballot argument, to pass muster. 
We live in a world where the concentrated poverty in Black and 
Latino neighborhoods has essentially been criminalized. Persistent 
surveillance, over-policing and prosecution of what are essentially 
crimes of condition rather than crimes of conduct also function in concert 
to create a new category of people of color whose rights can be restricted 
or disposed of completely without having to acknowledge any racist 
intent.74 Therefore, in the interest of fairness, in determining whether 
such laws are contrary to the equal protection clause, it is the racially 
                                                                                                             
71 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Byers v. 
Sun Savings Bank, 139 P. 948 (Okla. 1914)). 
72 Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 
85, 90 (2004). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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discriminatory impact, not intent, that should be the central focus in 
analysis. 
The Voting Rights Act, recognized and addressed this issue in its 
1982 amendment stating, “no voting qualification . . . or procedure shall 
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner 
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen . . . to 
vote on account of race or color.”75  With renewed confidence that the 
legislature’s clarity could not be misinterpreted, challenges to felon 
disenfranchisement laws resurfaced. In Wesley v. Collins, the court, after 
noting a history of discrimination with continuing present-day effects, 
held that other social and political factors, such as the state’s legitimate 
purpose for enacting the statute, led to the conclusion that there was no 
violation of the VRA.”76 And so, courts continued to chip away at the 
VRA.77 More recently, as discussed in Part II.C the Court in Shelby 
County v. Holder signaled its discontent with the VRA, and encouraged 
Congress to make it “up to date.” This note proposes that states should be 
mandated to automatically reinstate ex-felon voting rights after their 
sentences have been served. Because of the racially disproportionate 
impact that felon disenfranchisement laws have on the exercise of Black 
political power, the federal government should intervene to create a 
uniform system for automatic restoration of voting rights for ex-felons.  
This should be a key consideration in the updating of the Voting Rights 
Act. 
C.  Revisiting the Idea of Federal Intervention 
While there have been many unsuccessful attempts to invalidate 
disenfranchisement laws on constitutional grounds, the continued 
dilution of black political power will only ensure the preservation of 
                                                                                                             
75 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012). 
76  See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986). 
77 See Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Congress 
exempted felon disenfranchisement from reach of § 2) (“We agree with the Second 
Circuit that the language of § 2(a) is both broad and ambiguous and that judicial 
interpretation of a claim concerning felon disenfranchisement under the VRA may not be 
limited to the text of § (2)(a) alone”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 412 (2010). See also 
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2006) (listing reasons to conclude that 
Congress did not intend to include felon disenfranchisement provisions within coverage 
of VRA). See also Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(requiring proof of intentional discrimination) Here, noting long history of felon 
disenfranchisement, legislative history, affirmative sanction of Fourteenth Amendment, 
and safeguards of criminal justice system, the Ninth Circuit improperly ignored both the 
plain language of the Act and established Supreme Court precedent in requiring 
discriminatory intent to succeed on such a claim. 
98 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:81 
 
institutional racism.78 Arguments supporting felon disenfranchisement 
laws must be reconsidered in the context of the mass incarceration that 
has taken place in the last few decades. 
1. The Fourteenth Amendment Argument 
One theory that describes the states as “laboratories of democracy,” 
posits that powers reserved for each state, when exercised, can foster a 
diverse set of laws and those that are most successful will spread across 
the nation so citizens don’t vote with their feet and move to states with 
laws that are more aligned with their interests. 79 Besides the almost 
commonsensical reality that this theory has not played out as neatly as 
suggested,80 there is yet another issue. Most ex-felons, who have been 
stripped of their right to vote, are often also legally prohibited from 
travelling between states.81 Additionally, they encounter even more 
confusion about laws and processes of a new state if the decide to move 
across states. For instance, no state has a systematic mechanism set up to 
address ex-felon immigration, and scholars have observed that there is 
“no consensus among indefinite-disenfranchisement states on whether 
the disqualification is properly confined to the state of conviction, or 
should be considered in the new state of residence.”82  An ex-felon who 
attempts to weave through this maze of confusion must also contend with 
some state laws that make fraudulent voter registration a felony. 
Although the Supreme Court has not held that felon 
disenfranchisement is unconstitutional, it has suggested that arguments 
that felon disenfranchisement laws are outmoded are well founded but 
                                                                                                             
78 See Miles, supra note 72, at 86-87 (collecting observations on the disproportionality 
in disenfranchisement). 
79 See Lynn Eisenberg, Note, States As Laboratories For Federal Reform: Case 
Studies In Felon Disenfranchisement Law, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 575 
(2012). 
80 Interestingly, applying the states as laboratories theory in the context of felon 
disenfranchisement would suggest that the “most successful laws” are those that at the 
very least, allow ex-felons to vote after their post-incarceration parole or probation ends. 
See State Felon Voting Laws, PRO CON (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://felonvoting.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=286 (showing that fourteen 
states restore voting rights after incarceration and nineteen states restore voting rights 
after incarceration, parole and probation is completed.). 
81 Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 580. (“Under the rules of the Interstate Commission for 
Adult Offender Supervision (Interstate Compact) regarding transfers of persons on parole 
or probation, discretionary transfers require the transferring state to provide sufficient 
documentation to justify a request to transfer and the receiving state has the right to 
accept or reject such a transfer request.”). 
82 Id. at 581. 
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are to be addressed by the legislature.83 The Fourteenth Amendment is 
often resorted to as a means of challenging felon disenfranchisement 
statutes because, section 284 of the Fourteenth Amendment was originally 
written with the purpose of discouraging states from disenfranchising 
their constituents. One author has proposed a sliding scale approach for 
dealing with VRA challenges to felon disenfranchisement,85 much like 
that taken in Burdick v. Takushi.86 He proposes that courts consider the 
totality of the circumstances by combining factors that other courts and 
scholars currently discuss when addressing felon disenfranchisement 
challenges.  The proposed sliding scale would require plaintiffs to prove 
three elements: (1) he cannot vote due to the state’s disenfranchisement 
laws, (2) develop a record of statistical data suggesting racial bias in the 
state criminal justice system, and (3) show that his race faces a bias in 
the justice systems.87 
The sliding scale comes into play after the prima facie case is made. 
“When a plaintiff establishes significant racial bias and the challenged 
statute is expansive in scope, courts should apply strict scrutiny.”88 
“Conversely, when a plaintiff fails to show significant bias and the law is 
limited in scope, courts should apply rational basis review to the 
statute.”89 “If both the level of racial bias and the scope of the law are 
moderate, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny.”90This sliding scale 
approach rests on solid ground and also preemptively addresses any 
potential constitutionality concerns91 in that it  
[E]nables courts to distinguish the legally valid laws 
from the impermissible laws by focusing on the burden 
                                                                                                             
83 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55-56 (1974) (holding “that the Supreme 
Court of California erred in concluding that California may no longer, consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, exclude from the franchise 
convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles.”). 
84 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2.. 
85 See Thomas G. Varnum, Let’s Not Jump To Conclusions: Approaching Felon 
Disenfranchisement Challenges Under The Voting Rights Act, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
109, 128 (2008). 
86 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (instructing courts to weigh character 
and magnitude of burden, without identifying specific factors). Some courts require 
significant statistical evidence to show the burden is severe, but many courts seem to 
determine the severity of the burden instinctively.  




91 One such concern was mentioned in Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 326 (2d Cir. 
2006) (deciding that, because of explicit approval for felon disenfranchisement statutes in 
Section 2 of Fourteenth Amendment, VRA would alter federal-state balance if it covered 
these laws). 
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imposed on minority voting rights. This distinction 
enables section 2 of the VRA to parallel the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s minority rights protection, while 
respecting that Amendment’s limited authorization for 
felon disenfranchisement. Thus, allowing courts to strike 
specific felon disenfranchisement statutes under the 
VRA would neither conflict with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, nor unconstitutionally alter the federal-
state balance.92 
This approach rests on very solid footing and serious consideration 
must be given to revisiting the idea of federal intervention to protect the 
rights of these citizens from continuously being abridged. The sliding 
scale approach treads delicately so as not to compromise state 
sovereignty without there being a serious constitutional issue warranting 
federal intervention. 
2. The Eight Amendment Argument 
One other viable option to justify federal intervention that has 
generated far less attention is that felon disenfranchisement laws are 
cruel and usual punishment and as such, violate the Eight Amendment. 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits governmental imposition of “cruel and 
unusual punishments.”93 This argument is worthy of far more scholarship 
because constitutional limits on punishment are more restrictive than 
limits on regulations, so if it can be proved that felon disenfranchisement 
laws are punitive, they will be scrutinized under a more demanding set of 
legal standards. The first hurdle one must overcome when making such a 
bold assertion is proving that disenfranchisement is indeed punishment. 
As mentioned before, the social contract theory upon which felon 
disenfranchisement laws are based rests on the notion that bad actors that 
break the social contract should be removed from the rule making 
process. One author discussing felon disenfranchisement noted, “it 
punishes not only individual citizens, most of whom have otherwise paid 
their debt to society and reentered the free world, but the communities 
which bear the brunt of the criminal laws the political system enacts.”94 
However, in Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren classified these 
laws as a “non penal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise.”95 
                                                                                                             
92 Varnum, supra, note 85, at 140. 
93 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
94  Karlan, supra note 45, at 1169-70 (concluding felon disenfranchisement is 
fundamentally punitive). 
95 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958). 
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Interestingly, Chief Justice Warren never gave adequate support for this 
conclusion and in dealing with the issue of Trop he noted, “a statute that 
prescribes the consequence that will befall one who fails to abide by . . . 
regulatory provisions is a penal law.”96 This seems to directly conflict 
with his conclusion about disenfranchisement laws simply because the 
basis of these laws serve no other purpose than to put offenders in the 
‘naughty corner’ on voting day until they convince the state that they will 
behave. 
Additionally, the federal statute that bans the use of literacy tests 
nationwide because such tests served no compelling interest and 
perpetuated the exclusion of minority citizens, also barred denying the 
right to vote to citizens who could not establish that they “possess good 
moral character.”97 Moreover, Trop’s classification of 
disenfranchisement as regulatory does not hold up against all the statutes, 
later decisions and constitutional amendments that have transformed 
suffrage from being considered a privilege to now becoming a right of 
adult citizenship. 98 Consequently, it is my submission that the dicta in 
Trop that currently bars Eighth Amendment claims stands on very shaky 
ground.99 
Assuming one is successful in characterizing disenfranchisement as 
punishment, the second hurdle to overcome is proving that this 
punishment is in fact cruel and unusual. Innate in the term cruel and 
unusual is a level of fluidity. As society’s values change, so too will the 
meaning of cruel and usual punishment because it must be measured 
against what society deems appropriate punishment.  In Weems v. United 
States, the court provided that a state-imposed punishment may not be 
excessive, but must be “graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”100 
Given that the level or length of felon disenfranchisement is never 
lessened or increased based on the severity of a crime or any mitigating 
factors, some disenfranchised ex-felons who commit less serious crimes 
                                                                                                             
96 Id. at 97. 
97 See 52 U.S.C. § 10501 (2012) (providing that citizens cannot be denied the right to 
vote because of “failure to comply with any test or device” and defining “test or device” 
to mean “any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for 
voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) 
demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) 
possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered 
voters or members of any other class”). 
98 Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons And The 
Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 104 (2005). 
99 See id. at 106 (suggesting that courts grant little credence to Trop’s statement that 
the disenfranchisement of felons simply constitutes part and parcel of the states’ broad 
power to delimit the franchise). 
100 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
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may have a viable Eighth Amendment claim. First, they may argue that 
as a form of punishment, disenfranchisement violates the country’s 
current standards of decency.101 Second, petitioners may argue that 
disenfranchisement is a “grossly disproportionate” punishment for a 
particular offense.102 
To support an argument that felon disenfranchisement violates the 
country’s current standards of decency, one can present statistics such as 
a public opinion poll designed by sociologists from Northwestern 
University, Indiana University, and the University of Minnesota which 
suggests that approximately 80% of the American public supports 
restoration of voting rights for most ex-felons.103 While this evidence 
carries less weight than legislation and judicial precedence, it recognizes 
the fluidity of the ever-changing concept of cruel and unusual 
punishment.  In proving that disenfranchisement is grossly 
disproportionate punishment, it is easy to see that “categorical 
disenfranchisement of all ex-offenders convicted of a felony [that] lumps 
together crimes of vastly different gravity”104 is inherently 
disproportionate for those convicted of less serious offences. 
Additionally, since, disenfranchisement runs counter to the goals of 
rehabilitation and deterrence, instead of being categorized as a legitimate 
means to an end, it can appropriately be deemed cruel. 
3. Obstacles to Overcome 
Both the Fourteenth Amendment argument and the Eighth 
Amendment argument present the Supreme Court with ample support to 
inquire about and assess the constitutionality of each state’s 
disenfranchisement laws. In reviving these arguments, it is my hope that 
these laws will continue to be challenged with both arguments so the 
Court can reassess its stance on the issue. Fairness, integrity and 
democracy demand it.  It must be noted that the doctrine of stare 
decisis105 mandates that for these and any other arguments challenging 
felon disenfranchisement laws, they must contend with the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Richardson v. Ramirez and Trop v Dulles. The 
                                                                                                             
101 Wilkins, supra note 98, at 137. 
102 Id. 
103 Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in the United 
States, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 275, 280-81 (2004), http:// 
www.soc.umn.edu/uggen/Manza_Brooks_Uggen_POQ_04.pdf. 
104 Karlan, supra, note 45, at 1167. 
105 Stare decisis, a Latin term meaning “to stand by that which is decided,” dictates that 
precedential decisions are given great weight. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th 
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factors providing a basis for reconsidering precedence were discussed in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which noted, 
“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is 
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic 
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior 
decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective 
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”106 
The Court explained that it would first examine whether the central 
rule of the case in question has proven unworkable, or whether “the 
rule’s limitation on state power could be removed without serious 
inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the 
stability of the society governed by [the rule in question].”107 Also, the 
Court explained that it would look to see whether the doctrine in question 
has been abandoned by society and, whether the factual premises 
supporting the holding have fundamentally changed such that the central 
holding of the precedent is unjustifiable or irrelevant.108 
In considering whether to revise the holding in Richardson v. 
Ramirez, it wouldn’t be difficult to argue the impracticability of felon 
disenfranchisement laws.  In Part III, the inherent issues with the current 
framework for reinstatement of voting rights and felon classification, 
coupled with the discussion in part IV.A of the failure of these 
disenfranchisement statutes in preventing recidivism or promoting 
rehabilitation, clearly shows that felon disenfranchisement is an 
impractical means of furthering any legitimate state interests.  Also, it is 
clear from the discussions in this part IV regarding public opinion of 
these disenfranchisement statutes, which most persons disagree with 
felon disenfranchisement109 so it can be inferred that society has 
abandoned the social contract theory upon which felon 
disenfranchisement is based. Finally, it is a fact that over the last 40 
years, the rate of incarceration has grown at an extraordinary rate.110 
“[H]istorical estimates of the imprisonment rate in state and federal 
facilities . . . demonstrates that from 1925 until about the middle of the 
1970s the rate did not rise above 140 persons imprisoned per 100,000 of 
the population.”111 However, by 2011, the incarceration rate had raised to 
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423 persons per 100,000 of the population.112 Given that the rate of 
incarceration has risen so drastically, the implications of felon 
disenfranchisement are far more devastating, as evidenced by its impact 
on the 2000 general election, and consequently, the holding in 
Richardson v. Ramirez is ripe for reconsideration due to its grave 
implications that have only recently become evident. 
While arguments for reconsideration of the dicta in Trop v. Dulles 
were mentioned in Part IV.C.ii, we must also consider arguments in the 
context of deciding whether the factors for reconsidering that precedent 
have been met. In regards to the first factor, it appears that the 
classification of disenfranchisement statutes as regulatory and not 
punitive was not the central issue in Trop. The central issue was actually 
whether a forfeiture of citizenship comports with the Constitution113 and 
the resulting rule was that “denationalization as punishment is barred by 
the Eighth Amendment”114 and it results in a “total destruction of the 
individual’s status in organized society.”115 This ruling, as mentioned 
before, is laced with inconsistencies, and consequently, can either be 
reconsidered or merely “reinterpreted”116 to fit squarely with a new 
decision invalidating felon disenfranchisement laws.  If however we 
consider Justice Warren’s dicta as controlling, because the franchise of 
voting has evolved significantly since 1958, the denial of the franchise is 
akin to punishment, so Justice Warren’s sentiments simply don’t reflect 
the current reality of felon disenfranchisement.  Additionally, the 
statistics mentioned earlier also support the idea that felon 
disenfranchisement is in fact a means of punishment as society is in 
strong opposition of such laws. While Trop was already standing on very 
shaky ground, it appears that the factors for reconsidering its holding 
have been met and accordingly, the Supreme Court has a clear opening 
to reconsider its decision in Trop. 
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V. WILL WE CONTINUE TO KEEP THE BLACK MAN FROM THE 
BALLOT? 
“Keep the black man from the ballot and we’ll treat him as we 
please, with no means for protection, we will rule with perfect ease.”117 
The right to vote is a fundamental function of citizens in the 
democratic process. It gives each person a voice, a choice and a sense of 
belonging. For African Americans, it also represents a badge of freedom 
that many of their ancestors fought and died for. In 1965, Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. described voting as the foundation stone for political 
action. He noted, “With it the Negro can eventually vote out of office 
public officials who bar the doorway to decent housing, public safety, 
jobs, and decent integrated education. It is now obvious that the basic 
elements so vital to Negro advancement can only be achieved by seeking 
redress from government at local, state, and federal levels. To do this the 
vote is essential.”118 
The plight of Black America has lasted from the days of slavery to 
2016, and the clock is still ticking. Before Blacks could taste the true 
victory of freedom, they were again enslaved by institutional structures 
carefully designed to keep them oppressed. From the point of being 
granted the right to vote, there were literacy tests, polling taxes, 
grandfather clauses and now with mass incarceration for essentially 
“living while Black,”119 continued use of the device of felon 
disenfranchisement ensures that the full potency of the Black vote will 
never be a reality. Unless something is done to cure this societal defect, 
we can be sure that America will never reach its ideal as a post racial 
society. Because African Americans have historically been oppressed, 
the right to vote is one of the most powerful tools with which they can 
effect change that will bring them closer to true equality in America. It is 
with that right that they can “begin breaking down injustice and 
destroying the terrible walls which imprison men because they are 
different from other men.”120 
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By no means do I believe that crimes should go unpunished. I fully 
support the notion that those who engage in criminal conduct must be 
held accountable under the rule of law. However, it is the criminal justice 
system that is best situated to undertake the task of ensuring that 
individuals, armed with their constitutional rights, can state their case, be 
evaluated and, if necessary, punished according to the severity of their 
crime. Disenfranchisement after an individual has been released into 
society serves only as blanket over-punishment that disproportionately 
affects Black America by diluting its political power. If we are to believe 
that post-incarceration rehabilitation is truly a goal of America’s justice 
system, stripping ex-felons of their right to vote seems to directly 
undermine that goal. By demoting ex-felons to second-class citizens, we 
are reminding them that they are not truly ever welcome back into the 
community. We remind them that they are not equal.  Any threat to 
achieving true equality is really a threat to the entire democracy, and 
consequently, federal intervention is absolutely necessary to ensure that 
America continues towards its quest to “form a more perfect union.”121 
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